Abstract: Keccak is the final winner of SHA-3 competition and it can be used as message authentic codes as well. The basic and balanced divide-and-conquer attacks on Keccak-MAC were proposed by Dinur et al. at Eurocrypt 2015. The idea of cube attacks is used in the two attacks to divide key bits into small portions. In this paper, by carefully analysing the mappings used in Keccak-MAC, it is found that some cube variables could divide key bits into smaller portions and so better divide-and-conquer attacks are obtained. Furthermore, in order to evaluate the resistance of Keccak-MAC against divide-and-conquer attacks based on cubes, we theoretically analyse the lower bounds of the complexities of divide-and-conquer attacks. It is shown that the lower bounds of the complexities are still not better than those of the conditional cube tester proposed by Senyang Huang et al.. This indicates that Keccak-MAC can resist the divide-and-conquer attack better than the conditional cube tester. We hope that these techniques still could provide some new insights on the future cryptanalysis of Keccak.
Introduction
Keccak [1] is a family of sponge functions consisting of seven permutations, say Keccak-f [b], with b = 25, 50, 100, 200, 400, 800 or 1600. The largest permutation, i.e., Keccak-f [1600], was selected as the new SHA-3 standard by the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology in 2012, and so its security property has attracted much attention.
In keyless modes, Keccak is used as a hash function, and so attacking techniques against hash functions like preimage attacks and collision attacks etc. have been studied for Keccak by some researchers. In [2] and [3] , the preimage attack and the second preimage attack were implemented for round-reduced Keccak. In [4] , a collision attack on the 2-round and a near collision attack on the 3-round ⌊Keccak⌋ 224 and ⌊Keccak⌋ 256 were proposed. In [5] , the attacking rounds of ⌊Keccak⌋ 224 and ⌊Keccak⌋ 256 were improved to 4 and 5 for collision attacks and near collision attacks respectively. In [6] , based on the propagation analysis, the authors constructed distinguishers on the 6-round Keccak. Other techniques such as zero-sum distinguishers could also be applied to analyze Keccak. In [7] , several zero-sum partitions of size 2 1586 for 20-round Keccak were found. In [8] the authors gave some zero-sum partitions of size 2 1590 for the the full 24-round Keccak, and the size of the zero-sum partitions were further reduced to 2 1579 in [9] . In keyed modes, Keccak is used as stream ciphers, message authentication codes (MAC) denoted by Keccak-MAC and authenticated encryption schemes (see Keyak [10] ). For these keyed modes, the published cryptanalytical results are all given by cube attacks. In [11] , the author proposed three different attacks on stream ciphers based on Keccak, Keccak-MAC and Keyak. Firstly, the authors used cube attacks to break up to some 6-round Keccak variants. Secondly, cube testers were applied to predict output bits. Finally, the authors showed how to utilize the divide-andconquer attack based on cubes to recover the key for the 6-round Keccak-MAC and theoretically analysed the complexities of the 7-round case. In [12] , the authors proposed a new type of cube distinguisher called conditional cube tester to recover key bits of Keccak-MAC and Keyak. Making use of the conditional cube tester, compared with the attack in [11] , the authors either decreased the complexity or increased the number of attacking rounds.
In this paper, we focus on Keccak-MAC only. With more careful analysis of the mappings used in Keccak, we make a new investigation into the divide-and-conquer attack based on cubes.
Our contributions
In this paper, we mainly focus on the divide-and-conquer attack on the round-reduced Keccak-MAC. It is known that the complexity of the divide-and-conquer attack depends on how small portions the key bits can be divided into. In [11] , the authors divide the 128-bit key into two 64-bit small keys (basic attacks), which resulted in a high time complexity of the preprocessing phase. Fortunately, by analysing ρ mapping used in Keccak, we find cubes with eighteen (resp. thirty-four) effective key bits, which could divide the 128-bit key into smaller portions, for the 6-round (reps. 7-round) Keccak-MAC. This indicates that complexities of the divide-and-conquer attack could be dramatically reduced without any extra cost. Furthermore, in order to evaluate the resistance of Keccak-MAC against the divide-and-conquer attack, we theoretically analyse the lower bounds of the complexity of the divide-and-conquer attack on the round-reduced Keccak-MAC in two scenarios. In Scenario I, inspired by the attack idea in [11] , we only consider such cubes that the cube sums (derived from outputting bits) are only dependent on one of A [0] [0] and A [1] [0]. It is proved that in Scenario I for the 6-round (resp. 7-round) Keccak-MAC, the preprocessing time is lower-bounded by 2 41 (resp. 2 76 ), the memory is lower-bounded by 2 9 (resp. 2 12 ), and the online time is lower-bounded by 2 40 (resp. 2 75 ). Since there is no proof that an optimal cube for the divide-and-conquer attack should satisfy such restriction, we further remove the restriction on cubes in Scenario II. This means that in Scenario II, the cube sums of a cube may be dependent on both of A [0] [0] and A [1] [0], and we only care about whether the total number of effective key bits related to the cube could attain the minimum. Moreover, in Scenario II, we even neglect the specific rotation constants used in ρ, to see how small the attacking complexity could eventually be. It is proved that in Scenario II for the 6-round (resp. 7-round) Keccak-MAC, the preprocessing time is lower-bounded by 2 40 (resp. 2 73 ), the memory is lower-bounded by 2 8 (resp. 2 9 ), and the online time is lower-bounded by 2 39 (resp. 2 73 ). A comparison of our work with the best previously known attacks on the round-reduced Keccak-MAC is presented in Table 1 . It can be seen that even in such ideal scenario as scenario II, the attacking complexity is no better than that given in [12] . Thus the Keccak-MAC can resist the divide-and-conquer attack better than the conditional cube tester proposed in [12] . This paper is organized as follow. In Section 2, we introduce Keccak, Keccak-MAC and cube attacks briefly, review the divide-and-conquer attack presented in [11] and introduce our attack model in detail. In Section 3, we show that some cubes could divide the 128-bit key into smaller portions for 6-and 7-round Keccak-MAC. In Section 4, we theoretically analyse the lower bounds of the complexities of the divide-and-conquer attack on 6-and 7-round Keccak-MAC in two different scenarios. Finally, we conclude this paper in Section 5. Fig. 1 , which help simplify the description of our analysis. Furthermore, to remove any vagueness in the following discussions, the specific location of each lane is shown in Fig. 2 
is set to be zeros. The whole procedure includes two phases. During the first phase, which is called the absorbing phase, a r-bit message block is OXRed with the first r bits of the internal state every time. After absorbing all the message blocks, it moves to the second phase, which is called the squeezing phase. During this phase, it runs over the internal state iteratively and return the first r bits as output till the desired length of message digest is satisfied.
The default value for Keccak sponge function is b = 1600, c = 576, and n r = 24. For more information about Keccak sponge function, the readers can refer to [1] .
Keccak-MAC
The Keccak sponge function, say Keccak[r, c], can be used in the keyed modes, such as MACs. Keccak-MAC is constructed simply by prepending the secrete key to the message to calculate a tag. In this paper, we will focus on MACs of short messages such that the internal permutation Keccak-f [r + c] is applied only once. The construction of Keccak-MAC working on a single block is shown in Fig. 3 . 
Cube attacks
The cube attack was proposed by Itai Dinur and Adi Shamir in [13] . It could be applied to a wide range of cryptographic primitives, such as stream cipher Trivium [13] , block cipher KATAN [14] , and hash function Keccak [11] . In this subsection, we briefly introduce the idea of cube attacks, and readers could refer to [13] for more details.
In the cube attack against a cipher, an output bit z of the cipher is seen as a blackbox polynomial on secrete variables SV and public variables P V , say z = f (SV, P V ). For a subset of public variables, say
any term of h is not divisible by T , and P V \I represents the public variables which do not belong to I. Then the sum of f over all values of the variables in I is given by ∑
where C = {0, 1} k . If g is of low degree about SV (usually linear), then it is useful for recovering the value of secret variables. In the cube attack, the elements in I are called cube variables, C which collects all possible values of cube variables is called a k-dimensional cube, and g is called the superpoly of C (or of I).
The cube attack includes two phases, namely the preprocessing phase and the online phase.
• The preprocessing phase
The preprocessing phase does not depend on the value of secret key bits and needs to be carried out only once for a cipher. We need to find a number of cubes such that their superpolies are of low degree, particularly linear expressions. Since generally the algebraic normal form of f (SV, P V ) is very complex, this is accomplished by black polynomial test.
• The online phase
In this phase, an attacker online calculates the value of the superpoly for each cube found in the preprocessing phase (public variables not in a cube are fixed to be 0). This leads to a system of equations in secrete key variables. Solving the system of equations, some or all key bits could be recovered.
The previous divide-and-conquer attack
In [11] , the authors proposed two divide-and-conquer attacks on the 6-round Keccak-MAC. The main idea of the two attacks was to find cubes whose cube sums of all output bits only depend on a part of key bits. Exploiting the cube given above, the authors presented a basic divide-and-conquer attack on the round-reduced Keccak-MAC. The attack included two phases, namely, the preprocessing phase and the online phase.
• The preprocessing phase • The online phase Similarly, by selecting another cube in A [4] [2] and A [4] [3] , the possible values of A [1] [0] could be retrieved. Finally, in order to recover the full key, all combinations of the candidates independently obtained for A [0] [0] and A [1] [0] were enumerated and tested. The time complexity in the preprocessing phase was 2 96 and that of the online phase was 2 32 . Thus, the total time complexity was 2 96 , the data complexity was 2 32 , and the memory complexity was 2 64 . In this basic attack, the time complexity was dominated by the preprocessing phase, and so an improved attack called balanced attack was further proposed in [11] to tradeoff the complexity of the preprocessing and online phases. In the balanced attack, additional auxiliary variables in A[0] [1] were used to eliminate the dependency of the cube sums of the output bits on some of the variables of A[0] [0] . Thus, the time complexity of the preprocessing phase could be reduced from 2 96 to 2 64 . It was mentioned in Subsection 6.3 of [11] that the 6-round balanced attack could be extended to a 7-round attack by selecting a borderline cube of sixty-four variables in A [2] [2] and A [2] [3] with the data complexity 2 64 , the time complexity 2 97 , and the memory complexity 2 32 .
Attack models and parameters
It is known that there are two types of attacks towards a MAC. The first one is that an adversary could forge a MAC for a message that has not been authenticated. The second one is that an adversary could recover the secret key. Obviously, the second one is much stronger. In this paper, we would concentrate on recovering the secret key for the short messages such that the internal permutation would be applied only once. More precisely, we would target at some variants of Keccak-MAC with a 1600-bit state, the capacity parameter c = 256, and a 128-bit key. This means that in our attack model, we could choose a 1344-bit input message and obtain its 128-bit outputting tag. Thus, for a cube C, a cube sum could be derived by examining each 128 outputting bits, and so in the following paper, the cube sums of C refer to all 128 sums. 
More careful investigations into the divide-and-conquer attacks on
It is well known that the action of θ depends on the column parities only. This property is exploited in the previous paper [11] to make the algebraic degree of Keccak remain 1 on cube variables after the first round, by setting the cube variables in such a way that all the column parities are constants at the beginning of the first round. In this paper, we also exploit this property of θ, and we simply say that setting the cube variables satisfying the constant condition instead.
Besides, for the sake of convenience, we introduce the following definition of effective key bits of a cube. Definition 1. For a given cube, a key bit that will be multiplied with the cube variables by χ in the first round is called an effective key bit (or variable) of the cube.
By setting the cube variables satisfying the constant condition, the set of effective key bits is actually the same as the set of key bits which the 128 cube sums of outputting bits depended on. The reason for this is as follows. Considering the n-round Keccak-MAC, the degree of the Boolean function f representing an output bit would reach 2 n after n rounds. But if the cube variables are set to satisfy the constant condition initially, then as discussed above cube variables will not multiply with each other after the first round and so the degree of f on cube variables would be at most 2 n−1 . Hence, for a cube C of 2 n−1 -variables ensuring that the column parities are constant initially, each 128 cube sums of the outputting bits depend and only depend on the key bits multiplied with the 2 n−1 cube variables in the first round.
New results on the 6-round Keccak-MAC
In Section 6.1 of [11] , the authors selected the cube variables in A [2] [2] and A [2] [3] . For this cube, the authors pointed out that since the cube sums of output bits after six rounds depended on all the sixty-four bits of A [0] [0] (key bits), the time complexity of the preprocessing phase became as high as 2 96 . Consequently, in Section 6.2 of [11] , the authors proposed to use auxiliary variables to reduce the time complexity of the preprocessing phase. However, in the following part of this subsection, we shall show that in fact for some carefully chosen cubes, the cube sums only depend on eighteen key bits after six rounds. Thus, the time complexity and the memory complexity of the preprocessing phase could be dramatically decreased without any extra cost. Figure 4 (a) where the lane in orange(resp. pink) means that it includes secret variables(resp. cube variables). After θ, the state is shown in the Figure 4 (b) . The number in each lane is the offset that it has been rotated compared with the initial state. 
Fig. 4. The diffusion of cube variables and key bits in one round
Due to ρ, every lane of the state is rotated with a different offset , the state after ρ is shown in Figure 4 (c). The function of π is to reorder the lanes, thus, the state after π is shown as Figure 4 (d).
It worth noting that only three lanes (A[0][2], A[3][3] and A[0][4] in Figure 4 (d)) contain cube variables. From Figure 4, we know that v i = A[2][2][3 · i]
(the initial state) will multiply with k 3·i+62−2 = k 3·i−4 (Here the substraction and addition operations are done modulo 64). Similarly, we could obtain all the effective key bits, see Table 3 .
Hence, for C, its effective key bits are k 2 , k 5 , k 8 Similarly, we could construct cubes with eighteen effective key bits when recovering A [1] [0].
, and set By sliding the cube C in Theorem 1 five times (the effective key bits are slid as well), we get another five cubes, and so we could recover all the sixty-four bits of A[0] [0] . Similarly, by sliding the cube C in Theorem 2, we could get five cubes to recover all the sixty-four bits of A [1] [0]. In the preprocessing phase, for each of the chosen cubes, the cube sums are calculated and stored for all the possible values of its effective key bits. Thus, in this phase, the time complexity is 
New results on the 7-round Keccak-MAC
It is known that the algebraic degrees of output bits will reach 128 after seven rounds. Even if the column parities are kept constant, we need 64-variable cubes to implement divide-and-conquer attacks. However, we could still find cubes like those in Theorem 1 and 2. 
, and set
to keep the column parities of A [4] [ * ] constant, then the effective key bits of C are k 64+((19·i+16) mod 64) (0 ≤ i ≤ 33), namely, C has thirty-four effective key bits.
By sliding cubes in Theorem 3 and 4 (the effective key bits are slid as well), we get enough cubes to recover the 128-bit key. With the help of auxiliary variables, the time complexity in the preprocessing phase is about 2 84 , the memory complexity is about 2 67 , and the time complexity in the online phase is about 2 84 .
Lower bounds of complexities of divide-and-conquer attacks based on cubes
It can be seen that the complexity of divide-and-conquer attacks on Keccak-MAC is largely determined by the number of effective key bits, i.e., key bits multiplied with cube variables in the first round of Keccak-MAC. Small number of effective key bits is desirable in divide-and-conquer attacks. Thus, in this section, we discuss how small portions the key could be divided into in two different scenarios. 
Scenario I: cubs with a reasonable restriction
Inspired by the attacking idea in [11] , in this subsection, based on the cubes whose cube sums are independent on the value of A [1] [1] [0] after six (seven) rounds are wanted. Figure 5 (a) and (b) show the diffusion of the key bits in A [1] [0]. In Figure 5 , the orange squares represent the lanes containing key bits in bits in A [1] [0]. For a cube, it is easy to verify that only when cube variables are in the orange lanes with "C" inside (see Figure 5 , we could choose cube variables from four lanes. Hence, in both cases, there would be at least one lane containing at least eight cube variables. Since the key bits in the same lane are pairwise different, for such cubes, there would be at least eight effective key bits. However, with the consideration of the rotation constants used in the ρ, we could get more precise results. Firstly, we would introduce a helpful lemma. , and let
Here all the addition and subtraction operations are done modulo 64.
Proof. Suppose that I 1 = I 2 . Denote
It is obvious that
Firstly, we shall prove that
. 
On the other hand, for
is divisible by 64, we have
Hence,
Using Lemma 1, we could obtain the lower bounds of complexities of the divide-and-conquer attacks on the round-reduced Keccak-MAC. Proof. We would prove that in the case of recovering A [0] [0], for a 32-variable cube whose cube sums do not depend on the value of A [1] [0] after six rounds, the number of its effective key bits is at least nine. The case of recovering A [1] [0] could be proved similarly.
Let C be a 32-variable cube whose cube sums do not depend on the value of A [1] [0] after six rounds. Assume the number of effective key bits of C is eight. Then, there would be six lanes containing eight cube variables (two lanes are used to keep the column parities constant). Since the parities of the columns containing cube variables are kept constant, the locations of cube variables in lanes of the same sheet are the same. Let I = {i j |0 ≤ j ≤ 7} be the set of locations of cube variables in A [2] [i] (i ∈ {0, 2, 3}). Let I i be the set of key bits which would multiply with the cube variables in A [2] [i] (i ∈ {0, 2, 3}) in the first round. According to the proof of Theorem 1, I i = {i j + m i } (i ∈ {0, 2, 3}), where m i (i ∈ {0, 2, 3}) is determined by θ and the rotation constants used in ρ. In this case, we could obtain that m 0 = 60, m 2 = 63 and m 3 = 5, see Figure  6 . Since the number of effective key bits is eight, we have I 0 = I 2 = I 3 . According to Lemma 1, |I| could be divisible by = 64, that is, we get a contradiction. Hence, for a 32-variable cube whose cube sums do not depend on the value of A [1] [0] after six rounds, the minimum number of its effective key bits would be at least nine. In the case of the 7-round Keccak-MAC, we obtain the similar conclusion. According to Theorem 5 and 6, we could obtain the lower bounds of the complexities of the divide-and-conquer attack on the round-reduced Keccak-MAC, see Table 4 . Since there is no proof that an optimal cube for the divide-and-conquer attack should satisfy such restriction in the above subsection. In this subsection, we shall consider the lower bounds of complexities of divide-and-conquer attacks based on cubes without any restriction, and we even neglect the specific rotation constants used in ρ. That is to say, we could choose cube variables from nineteen lanes (c = 256 and the 128-bit key is placed in A [0] [0] and A [1] [0]). Since we need to the keep the parities of columns containing cube variables constant, we could only choose cube variables from at most fourteen lanes, see Figure 7 . In Figure 7 , the squares with "cp" represent lanes used to keep the column parities constant, the orange squares mean lanes containing key bits, the pink squares represent lanes padded zeros (the capacity part) and the blank squares means lanes we could choose cube variables from. 
Fig. 7. lanes which could be chosen cube variables from
In the case of the 6-round Keccak-MAC, we need 32-variable cubes to complete the divide-and-conquer attack. We could choose cube variables from lanes in five sheets at most. For example, if we choose cube variables from lanes in the same sheet, there are at most three lanes could be used (one lane is used to keep the column parities constant), then there would be at least one lane containing ⌈32/3⌉ = 11 cube variable. Hence, there would be eleven bits of the fourth lane containing cube variables for keeping the column parities constant. In other words, there would be 32 + 11 = 43 state bits containing cube variables. We summarize the result of each case in Table  5 . As we can see in Table 5 , there would be at least forty-three state bits containing cube variables after π. In other words, there would be at least forty-three key bits multiplying with cube variables (some of these forty-three key bits may be the same). Due to θ, one key bit would diffuse to eleven state bits after θ in the first round. For a 32-variable cube (parities of columns containing cube variables are kept constant), there would be at least ⌈43/11⌉ = 4 effective key bits.
In fact, after θ, there are only seven lanes which are next to only one lane containing key bits. What is more, these seven lanes are in two sheets, see the pink squares in Figure 8 . When we choose cube variables from lanes in two sheets, there would be at least one lane containing six cube variables. Since the key bits in the same lane are pairwise different, there would be at least six effective key bits. When we choose cube variables from at least three sheets, it is possible that the number of effective key bits is less than 6. Since cube variables come from at least three different sheets, there exist some cube variables which do not belongs to the above seven lanes. Hence, there exist at least two cube variables multiplying with two key bits. Namely, in this case, there would be at least ⌈(41 + 2 · 2)/11⌉ = 5 effective key bits.
Fig. 8. Lanes which would be next to only one lane containing key bits after π
Similarly, in the case of the 7-round Keccak-MAC, for a 64-variable cube, we obtian that the number of the effective cube variables would be at least ten effective key bits.
Even if the technique of auxiliary variables could be used, the lower bounds are still not better than the complexities of the conditional cube tester in [12] . We summarize the lower bounds of complexities of divide-and-conquer attacks on the 6-round and the 7-round Keccak-MAC in Table  6 . 
Conclusion
In this paper we study divide-and-conquer attack against Keccak-MAC. Improved divide-andconquer attacks against 6-and 7-round Keccak-MAC are given by exploiting the property of ρ which is not paid enough attention by the previous attackers. Furthermore, we theoretically analyse the lower bounds of complexities of divide-and-conquer attacks on the round-reduced Keccak-MAC. It is shown that the Keccak-MAC can resist the divide-and-conquer attack better than the conditional cube tester no matter which rotation constants are used in the ρ mapping.
